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THE PERJURIOUS DEFENDANT: A PROPOSED
SOLUTION TO THE DEFENSE LAWYER'S
CONFLICTING ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS TO
THE COURT AND TO HIS CLIENT
WILLIAM

H. ERICKSON*

INTRODUCTION

In a criminal case, defense counsel has a dual function: officer of the
court and trained legal advocate for his accused client. The roles conflict
when the lawyer learns that his client intends to offer false or otherwise misleading testimony. How does the defense lawyer reconcile his obligations
and duties to the court with those he owes to his client? Legal experts have
offered various solutions, none of which have been enthusiastically accepted.'
The purpose of this article is to explore the nuances of, and offer a solution
to, the ethical dilemma faced by a defense lawyer who is confronted with a
client who intends to commit perjury.'
The American adversary system of criminal justice is not inquisitorial,
but accusatory. 2 Evidence is presented to the judge or jury by trained advofactual issues may, be
cates according to established rules, so that conflicting
3
resolved and truth emerge as the final product.
Chief Justice Burger, in a now well-known metaphor, has compared the
American adversary system to a tripod or three-legged stool. 4 The judge,
prosecutor, and defense lawyer form the three legs of the tripod. Each must
be equally strong and must fulfill his separate duties if the tripod of justice is
to maintain its stability and strength. 5 Adding strength to the tripod are the
* Deputy Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme Court. Chairman, American Bar Association
(ABA) Special Committee on the Administration of Criminal Justice 1973-1976; Chairman,
ABA Committee to Implement the Standards for Criminal Justice, 1977-1981; Chairman, ABA
Adjunct Committee on Implementation of Criminal Justice Standards, 1981-1982; Judicial
Member-at-Large, ABA Board of Governors, 1976-1979. The author gratefully acknowledges
the research and writing assistance provided by Ted Allegra and Kathryn Nielson.
1. A lawyer's belief that his client intends to commit perjury must be based upon his
independent investigation of the evidence or his client's statement of a clear intent to commit
perjury. Mere inconsistency in the client's story is not sufficient to support the lawyer's belief.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 7.7, commentary at 276 (1st ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as STANDARDS (1st ed.)].

2. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
3. Set generally United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
4. Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Second Plenary Session, American Bar
Association Annual Meeting (July 16, 1971). See generally Burger, The Special Skills of Adwcacy:
Are Specialized Trainingand Certhficationof Adzxats Essential to Our System ofjustice?, 42 FORDHAM

L. REV. 227 (1973).
5. Set Erickson, Standardsof Competeny for Defense Counsel in a CriminalCare, 17 Am. CRIM.
L. REV. 233 (1979); Erickson, TM History oft/e TripodofJutsite, 64 Mi.L L. REv. 79 (1974).
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American Bar Association (ABA) Standards for Criminal Justice which relate to the functions of the trial judge, the prosecution (Prosecution Standards), and the defense (Defense Standards), 6 and the ABA7 Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code of Professional Responsibility).
In our legal system there are many deterrents to the introduction of
false or improper evidence at trial. First, the ABA Prosecution Standards
and the Code of Professional Responsibility emphasize that the prosecutor's
function is to seek justice, not merely to convict. 8 Well-established precedent
forecloses the prosecutor from using false or perjured testimony in the pursuit of a conviction. 9 Second, evidentiary and exclusionary rules screen out
unreliable evidence and prevent overzealous law enforcement. 10 Finally, the
Defense Standards classify intentional misrepresentation of fact or law to the
court as unprofessional conduct.'" The defense lawyer who knowingly uses
false evidence deflects the truth finding process as much, if not more, than
the overzealous police officer or prosecutor. The misconception that the defense lawyer is the alter ego and mouthpiece of the accused, speaking with
the erudition of a lawyer but espousing only the views of his client, has been
12
put to rest.
6. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as PROSECUTION
STANDARDS OR DEFENSE STANDARDS].
7. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA
CODE].
8. PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 3-1.1(C); ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7103(B). See also People v. Elliston, 181 Colo. 118, 508 P.2d 379 (1973); People v. Walker, 180
Colo. 184, 504 P.2d 1098 (1973).
9. The United States Supreme Court has strongly condemned the prosecution for offering
false evidence and has set aside convictions obtained by the use of evidence known to be false:
More than 30 years ago this Court held the Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a
state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence. Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103. There has been no deviation from that established principle.
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213; cf.Alcorta v. Texas, 355
U.S. 28. There can be no retreat from that principle here.
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
10. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); see also Oaks, Stud:ng the Exclusionaqy Rule in Search and Seiure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).
11. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 4-7.5. When an accused client or attorney
presents false documentary evidence or affidavits to the trier of fact, the courts are in general
agreement in barring such evidence. See, e.g., Utz v. State Bar, 21 Cal. 2d 100, 130 P.2d 377
(1942); In re Trimble, 226 Ind. 187, 79 N.E.2d 213 (1948); In re Ellis, 155 Kan. 894, 130 P.2d 564
(1942); In re Kenner, 178 La. 774, 152 So. 520 (1931); State v. Fisher, 103 Neb. 736, 174 N.W.
320 (1919). In addition, the signature of a lawyer on a pleading submitted to the court constitutes certification that, to the best of his information, knowledge, and belief, it is truthful. See,
e.g., COLO. R. Clv. P. 11. The criminal defense lawyer's duty not to use false testimony of
persons other than the defendant is also well-established. See, e.g., People v. Schultheis, No. 80SC-299 (Colo. Oct. 19, 1981); Herbert v. United States, 340 A.2d 802, 804 (D.C. 1975); People
v. Pike, 58 Cal. 2d 70, 96, 372 P.2d 656, 672, 22 Cal. Rptr. 664, 680 (1962). See aLso M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 32 (1975).
12. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 4-1.1, commentary at 4.9. Chief Justice Burger
advocates this principle:
The popular misconceptions about the functions of lawyers in criminal cases flow
from many sources including misconduct of some lawyers themselves . . . and a misplaced sentimentality which has put some lawyers in doubt as to their function.
One result of these fallacious and blurred conceptions of the advocate's function is
the public image of the criminal lawyer as the servile 'mouthpiece' or the alter ego of
the accused or one who does for the accused what the accused would do for himself if
he had the legal skills . . . [This] is totally incompatible with the basic duty of a
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The Defense Standards describe the role of the modern defense attorney
as the accused's professional representative---counselor and advocate-but
not alter ego.1 3 The Standards stress establishment of a close lawyer-client
relationship through private, confidential communications.' 4 The Standards
also specify that it is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer who is interviewing a client to encourage less than candid responses.' 5 The attorney should
probe for all legally relevant information without seeking to influence the
response. 16

The tension between the defense lawyer's role as an officer of the court
and his duty to act as a zealous advocate and representative of his accused
client creates the lawyer's dilemma. Any solution to this dilemma which fails
to protect the integrity of the truth-finding function of the adversary system
ofjustice is inadequate. This article will examine the different approaches to
the ethical dilemma which confronts defense counsel when the client intends
to commit perjury, and will propose a practical, ethically acceptable
solution.
I.

THE ETHICAL DILEMMA

A conflict between defense counsel's ethical obligations to the court and
those to his client surfaces when the accused client insists upon testifying in
his own defense and makes known his intent to commit perjury. The Defense Standards recognize that a defendant has certain rights-to decide the
plea which should be entered, whether trial will be to a jury or to the court,
and whether to testify in his own defense.' 7 As a result, defense counsel can
strongly advise the client not to testify, but cannot prevent the client from
testifying and committing perjury.
On the other hand, after consulting with the client, defense counsel is
the "captain of the ship" and thus the final arbiter for general trial tactics,
lawyer as an officer of the court and contrary to the traditions and ethics of the legal
profession.
A lawyer . . . advocates but does not identify with his client. The alter ego or
mouthpiece school of thought, which is happily a minute fraction of the legal profession, would carry this perverted notion to the point of complete identification of lawyer with client, i.e., the lawyer as an extension of the accused himself with a
community of interest, motivation, and goals, bound to engage in falsehood and chicane at the command of the client. These concepts have long been rejected. . . and
find no acceptance among honorable members of the bar.
The lawyer. . . should be. . . a professional advocate with a highly important
but nonetheless limited function, .e., limited and circumscribed by the rules of the
system and the ethics of the profession. At the trial stage his duty is to put the prosecution to its proof, to test the case against the accused, to insist that the procedural
safeguards be followed and to put forward evidence which is valid, relevant and helpful to his client. On appeal his function is to point to trial errors, if such there be, and
expound the applicable rules of law. In short, he is to 'put his client's best foot
forward.' . . . Johnson v. United States, 360 F.2d 844, 846-47 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
13. DEFENSE STANDARDS, suepra note 6, § 4-1.1.

14. Id. §4-3.1.
15. Id. § 4-3.2.
16. Id.
17. Id. § 4-5.2(a). The United States Supreme Court has not specifically recognized a de-

fendant's constitutional right to testify in his own behalf. Set Robinson, The Perjwvy Diemma i
Adversary System, 82 DIcK. L REV. 545, 554-61 (1978).

an
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strategy, and witness selection.' 8 If the attorney and client disagree on significant matters of trial tactics, the Standards direct the attorney to make a
confidential record of the circumstances, his advice and reasons, and the conclusion reached.' 9
The perjury issue assumes ethical dimensions when defense counsel
knows that his client intends to offer false testimony. The lawyer's dilemma
arises from his duty as an officer of the court not to offer false testimony and
his concomitant duty to his client to preserve confidential communications
and to discover all relevant facts known to the accused in order to prepare an
effective defense. 20 The first component of the dilemma is created by counsel's obligation to determine "all relevant facts known to the accused."'2 1 It
is axiomatic that counsel is unable to prepare a. good case if ignorant of
essential facts; thus, the foundation for the requirement that defense counsel
investigate and obtain all relevant facts is rooted in the sixth amendment's
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. 22 The lawyer's obligation to provide the client with an effective defense depends on the client's willingness to
disclose all relevant facts, no matter how prejudicial or embarrassing. Accordingly, protecting client confidences is one of the attorney's most sacred
obligations2 3 and is "so essential to effective representation and to the proper
functioning of the legal system that the obligation is protected by the attor'

ney-client privilege. "24

The second component of the dilemma is created'by the lawyer's oath,
which is uniformly required for admission to the bar. In Colorado, the prospective lawyer pledges: "I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the
causes confided to me such means only as are consistent with truth and
honor, and will never seek to mislead the Judge or jury by any artifice or
false statement of fact or law. .... "25 Thereafter the lawyer is an officer of
'2 6
the court whose official conduct "should be characterized by candor."
Moreover, in most states, every lawyer is bound by the professional stan18.

DEFENSE STANDARDS,

supra note 6, § 4-5.2.

19. Id.
20. Professor Monroe H. Freedman has described the lawyer's position as a "trilemma."
Set M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 27-42. Substantially the same material from Professor
Freedman's book is reprinted in Freedman, Perjiy." The ,awyer Tninma, 1 LITIGATION 26
(1975).
21. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 27, (quoting STANDARDS (1st ed.), supra note 1, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.2(a)).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The United States Supreme
Court has interpreted this provision in several landmark cases. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In some jurisdictions, the right to counsel

has been interpreted to require that counsel present an accused as a witness if the accused
wishes to testify, even if counsel knows the testimony will be false. See, e.g., State v. Trapp, 52
Ohio App. 2d 189, 368 N.E.2d 1278 (1977).
23. ABA CODE, supra note 7, Canon 4.

24. Robinson, supra note 17, at 548. See aLr, ABA CODE, supra note 7, EC 4-1.
25. CoLO. R. CIv. P. 220.
26. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 27 (quoting ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
No. 22). See also ABA CODE, supra note 7, EC 9-6; ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 287 (1953).
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dards contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility, 2 7 which also
forecloses the use of perjured testimony and protects a client's privileged
28
communications to his lawyer.
Therefore, defense counsel faces seriously conflicting obligations when
he becomes aware that a client intends to commit perjury. Which obligation
is paramount: The duty of candor to the court or the duty to preserve inviolate client confidences? If the defense attorney reveals to the court the client's intent to commit perjury, conviction and enhanced punishment are
likely. On the other hand, if the defendant's intent is not revealed, the attorney participates in deceiving the court and the jury.
II.
A.

ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE DEFENSE LAWYER

ABA Code of ProfessionalResponsibibiy

The American Bar Association adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969, effective January 1, 1970.29 Recognizing that the former Canons of Professional Ethics 30 were "generalizations designed for an
earlier era," 3 ' the Code of Professional Responsibility sought to provide
"clear, peremptory rules in the critical areas relating most directly to the
duty of lawyers to their clients and to the courts." ' 32 The Code's mixture of
Canons, Disciplinary Rules, and Ethical Considerations, 33 however, often
fails to prescribe a precise course of conduct for criminal lawyers.
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(4) dictates that a lawyer shall not "knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence."' 34 While this provision, at
27. Colorado has adopted the Code as the standard of professional conduct for lawyers
licensed to practice in Colorado. COLO. R. Civ. P. 223.
28. Set ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(B)(1), DR 4-101.
29. ABA CODE, supra note 7, at Preface. The Code replaced the Canons of Professional
Ethics adopted by the ABA in 1908. These Canons were originally derived from the first organized code of professional ethics, which was adopted in 1887 by the Alabama State Bar Association. The Alabama code, in turn, was based on a series of lectures by Judge George
Sharswood at the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1854. Sharswood's lectures emphasized an attorney's differing roles to the client, the public, the state, and to his "professional
brethren." Set Armstrong, A Centuy ofLegal Elthics, 64 A.B.A.J. 1063 (1978).
30. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics, as amended (1908).
31. ABA CODE, supra note 7, at Preface.
32. Armstrong, supra note 29, at 1069 (quoting from the 1965 annual address to the American Bar Association by former ABA President Lewis Powell).
33. The provisions of the Code are divided into Canons, Disciplinary Rules, and Ethical
Considerations, each of which is described in the Code as follows:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the
standards of profesional conduct expected of lawyers in relationships with the public,
with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules are derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a
body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific
situations.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in
character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. Within the framework
of fair trial, the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers, regardless of the nature of their professional activities.
ABA CODE, supra note 7, at Preliminary Statement.
34. Id. DR 7-102(A)(4). Various court decisions have held that a rule of this type overrides
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first glance, may seem to be unambiguous, the related Disciplinary Rules
and Ethical Considerations do not indicate how defense counsel should comply with the rule if his client insists upon taking the witness stand and testifying falsely. 35 In fact, Ethical Consideration 7-26 complicates this ambiguity
by expanding a lawyer's obligation not to use perjured testimony or evidence
in situations where he "knows, orfrom facts within his knowledge, should know,
36
that such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent, or perjured."
Other provisions of the Code provide no clarification. Disciplinary Rule
4-101 states the general rule prohibiting a lawyer from revealing the confidences and secrets of his client. 37 Subsection C of DR4-101, however, makes
an important qualification: "A lawyer may reveal . . . the intention of his
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime."

38

Does perjury committed during the course of a client's testimony constitute a crime within the meaning of DR 4-101(C)? The plain meaning of the
rule would indicate that perjury, since it is a crime, would fall within the
exception. Professor Freedman, however, has argued to the contrary. 39 He
bases his position on the extreme prejudice that can result from informing a
judge of the defendant's intention to lie under oath, since that judge may
later hear the case and sentence the defendant. 40 In addition, statutory enactments in some jurisdictions preclude prosecution for perjury when the
defendant's false statement was a denial of his guilt at trial. 4 1 Regardless of
whether perjury is a crime to which the rule applies, it is important to note
that the exception is discretionary. It provides only that a lawyer may reveal
the intentions of his clients to commit a crime; it does not dictate
revelation.

42

a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., People v. Schultheis, 618 P.2d
701 (Colo. App. 1980), rev'd, No. 80-SC-299 (Colo. Oct. 19, 1981); see also In re Branch, 70 Cal.
2d 200, 449 P.2d 174, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1969); People v. Pike, 58 Cal. 2d 70, 372 P.2d 656, 22
Cal. Rptr. 664 (1962); People v. Lewis, 75 11. App. 2d 560, 393 N.E.2d 1380 (1979); State v.
Trapp, 52 Ohio App. 2d 189, 368 N.E.2d 1278 (1977).
35. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 29. See also Lawry, Lying, Confident.'t and/he Adversay
System ofjoustce, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 653; Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809 (1977).
36. ABA CODE, supra note 7, EC 7-26 (emphasis added.)
37. Id. DR 4-101(A), (B). The rule provides:
Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client
(A) 'Confidence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and 'secret' refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of
which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a
third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
See generally Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1978); In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534
F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976).
38. Id. DR 4-101(C). See generaly State v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
39. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsiibty of the CriminalDefense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966).
40. Id. at 1476-78.
41. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-507 (1973).
42. But see ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 314 (1965) (interpreting ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, (1908)), which indicates that a lawyer must dis-
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Similarly, the rule relating to frauds upon the court fails to provide adequate guidance to a lawyer who discovers that his client has committed
perjury:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: [h]is
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except
is protected as a privileged
when the information
43
communication.

The straightforward requirement that attorneys report client frauds upon
the court, 44 however, is also muddled by a qualification. Under DR 7102(B)(1), if defense counsel learns of his client's fraud through "a privileged
communication," he need not inform the court. 45 The Code, however, fails
46
to provide any clear definition of which communications are so privileged.
Moreover, DR 4-101(C)(2) allows a lawyer to reveal confidences or secrets
whenever "permitted" under the Disciplinary Rules.4 7 It is uncertain, however, which confidences and secrets falls within the "privileged communication" clause in DR 7-102(B)(1), so as to permit their disclosure. 48
close even the confidences of his clients if "the facts in the attorney's possession indicate beyond
a reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed."
43. ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(B)(1). Cf. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAW-

rule I I(d) (1971): "Subject to whatever qualifications may
exist from the confidential privilege that exists between a lawyer and his client, the lawyer
should expose without fear before the proper tribunals perjury, subornation of perjury and any
professional misconduct."
44. The use of perjured testimony or false evidence is generally regarded as a fraud upon
the court for the purposes of DR 7-102(B)(1). Set ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT rule 3.3 at 128 (Proposed Final Draft May 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as ABA MODEL
RULs].
45. ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(B)(1). As originally adopted, the rule did not
contain any exception; it was added in the 1974 amendments to the Code. Hence, it may be
argued that the purpose of the original wording of the provision was to make disclosure
mandatory in all situations. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 20; A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS
YERS, CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT

IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 147 (1976).

Further, the ABA STANDARDS, referring to the

original draft of DR 7-102(B)(1), state that the provision "is construed as not embracing the
giving of false testimony in a criminal case." STANDARDS (1st ed.), supra note 1, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, Supplement at 18. Therefore, even before the amend-

ment the clause did not apply to the criminal defense lawyer. Set M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11,
at 29. One ABA Opinion states that
[t]he tradition (which is backed by substantial policy considerations) that permits a
lawyer to assure a client that information (whether a confidence or a secret) given to
him will not be revealed to third parties is so important that it should take precedence,
in all but the most serious cases, over the duty imposed by DR 7-102(B).
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 341 (1975).
46. A. KAUFMAN, supra note 45, at 147.

47. ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(C)(2).
48. A. KAUFMAN, supra note 45, at 147. "Confidences and secrets" are defined in ABA
CODE, supra note 7, DR 4-101(A). Set also note 37 supra. The ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility has attempted to resolve this uncertainty through circular reasoning:
"The balancing of the lawyer's duty to preserve confidences and to reveal frauds is best made by
interpreting the phrase 'privileged communications' . . . as referring to those confidences . . .
that are required to be preserved by DR 4-101."
OPINIONS, No. 341 (1975).

ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
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The Defense Standards Proposal

Proposed section 4-7.7 of the Defense Standards 49 provides another answer to the ethical dilemma. When a lawyer discovers that his client intends
to commit perjury, he must strongly advise his client not to offer the false or
misleading testimony. If the defendant insists on taking the stand and testifying falsely, defense counsel must seek to withdraw from the case. The motion to withdraw should not specify the basis for withdrawal and the
intended perjury should not be revealed to the court. If withdrawal is not
feasible because trial is imminent or has commenced, or if the motion to
withdraw is denied, defense counsel should limit direct examination of the
defendant to those areas where counsel believes that the defendant's answers
will not be perjurious. The lawyer should avoid direct examination on matters which defense counsel believes the defendant will offer perjurious testimony. He should merely ask the defendant if he wishes to make any
additional statement concerning the case to the judge or jury. Defense counsel should then make a record, out of the presence of the jury, of the fact that
his client is taking the stand against his advice. 50
In an attempt to accommodate conflicting ethical duties, the Defense
Standard properly stresses the lawyer's duty not to present known false testimony. 5 1 Nonetheless, the proposal presents significant difficulties. 52 The
constitutional and practical deficiences of implementing section 4-7.7 have
53
come to light in recent efforts to prepare a new code of ethical conduct.
The defendant could assert the denial of the effective assistance of counsel 54 because the lawyer is prohibited from developing the perjured testimony on direct examination, or advocating acceptance of the testimony in
closing argument. Similarly, the fact that a lawyer is subject to disciplinary
sanctions for presenting false testimony forces the lawyer to take a position
55
adverse to his client.
In addition, section 4-7.7 presents several practical problems. First, if
the trial is about to commence or has already begun, the court will in all
likelihood deny the motion to withdraw.
Second, since the defense lawyer is prohibited from disclosing his reasons for withdrawal, denial of the motion is inevitable. Inquiry by the court
49. The 1980 version of the STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE only contains a proposed
standard relating to the perjurious defendant. The ABA House of Delegates has deferred adoption of proposed section 4-7.7 until the ABA Special Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards reports its final recommendations. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 4-7.7, editorial note at 4.95. The proposed standard, however, is substantially similar to the 1971 version.
The most significant change is that the 1980 version adds a provision which states that "it is
unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to lend aid to [the defendant's] perjury or use the perjured testimony." DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 4-7.7(c).
50. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 4-7.7.
51. ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-102(A)(4).
52. See Lefstein, The Cnial
Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethinkng the Defense Lawyer's
Dilemma, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665 (1978); Robinson, supra note 17.
53. See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 44; AMERICAN LAWYERS CODE OF CONDUCT (Discussion Draft June 1980).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
55. Lowrey v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1978) (Hufstettler, J., specially concurring); State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976).
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into the lawyer's motives for withdrawal forces the lawyer either to disregard
his confidential relationship with his client or to stand mute. In either event,
the court will conclude that the defendant intends to commit perjury and
therefore, will consider the defendant's conduct an obstruction of justice.
Upon conviction, an enhanced sentence can be anticipated.
Third, section 4-7.7 does not state what the defense lawyer should do if
the prosecutor objects to defense counsel's narrative question. 56 Moreover,
the prosecution is permitted to emphasize the defense lawyer's failure to develop the client's testimony. As a result, the focus of the trial shifts from a
determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged, to
an inquiry into the defendant's perjury.
Finally, if the lawyer is permitted to withdraw, the defendant may use
the same tactic with new counsel to obtain unlimited continuances. The
delays which could result from such a procedure are intolerable. After having been "educated" by his former lawyer's refusal to present perjured testimony, the defendant may begin his relationship with new counsel with a
false statement of the facts. If this "truthful" testimony is all that is known,
the new counsel is not involved in presenting known false evidence to the
court. The ends of justice, however, are subverted because the defendant is
still presenting false testimony.
A brief analysis of Lowrq v. Cardwell5 7 highlights the deficiencies of section 4-7.7. The defendant in Lowrey was charged with first-degree murder.
During a trial to the court, the defendant took the stand and offered what
defense counsel believed to be perjured testimony. Counsel then requested a
recess and, without stating his reasons, moved to withdraw. The motion was
denied. Thereafter, counsel did not develop his client's testimony and did
not rely on the testimony in closing argument. The trial judge found the
defendant guilty of second-degree murder.
In reversing the defendant's conviction and remanding for a new trial,
the court of appeals concluded that the defendant was denied a fair trial
because defense counsel's action amounted to an unequivocal announcement
to the judge that his client was testifying falsely. In a special concurrence,
Judge Hufstettler stated that the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel:
[W]hen defense counsel moved to withdraw, he ceased to be an
active advocate of his client's interests. Despite counsel's ethical
concerns, his actions were so adverse to [the defendant's] interests
as to deprive her of effective assistance of counsel. No matter how
commendable may have been counsel's motives, his interest in saving himself from potential violation of the canons was adverse to
his client, and the end product was his abandonment of a diligent
58
defense.
The Defense Standards approach constitutes an effort to limit the effect
56. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 37.
57. 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
58. Id. at 732 (Hufstettler, J., specially concurring).
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of perjured testimony. The flaws in section 4-7.7, however, compromise the
integrity of the truth-finding process.
C.

The ProposedModel Rules of Professional Conduct

The ABA Special Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
is presently drafting a new set of ethical rules-the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules). 5 9 The Commission, commonly known as the
Kutak Commission, 6° was created in 1977 after the ABA Board of Governors accepted the recommendation of the late President William B. Spann,
Jr., to "thoroughly and systematically rethink not only the Code of Professional Responsibility, but also the entire range of issues in ethical lawyering." 6 ' The fourth draft of the Model Rules is now being considered; 62 its
approach differs markedly from that of former codes. Various social, economic, and technological changes in the legal system during the past decade,
which are reflected in such areas as lawyer advertising and specialization,
have caused the Commission to recognize the need for more definitive rules.
To reach that end, the Commission has taken "the underlying structural
thrust of the Code of Professional Responsibility-its bifurcation of disciplinary rules and ethical considerations-to its next logical step by drafting
rules that are the foundation of good professional conduct ... .
In approaching the lawyer's dilemma, the Model Rules identify the
64
need for the attorney, as an advocate, to insure candor to the tribunal.
Although the Model Rules recognize that a criminal accused has a right to
the assistance of an advocate, a right to testify in his own defense, and a right
of confidential communication with counsel, 65 the Kutak Commission maintains that an accused should not have a right to assistance of counsel in
committing perjury. 66 In the Commission's view, the law imposes obligations and restraints on lawyers which may conflict with the client's ultimate
objectives. 67 Therefore, the Commission asserts that an advocate has an ethical and legal obligation to avoid implicating himself in the commission of
59. ABA MODEL

RULES, supra

note 44.

60. Robert J. Kutak of the national firm of Kutak, Rock and Huie is chairman of the ABA
Commission. Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. of Yale Law School is the reporter.
61. Kutak, Comnhg. The New Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 66 A.B.A.J. 47 (1980).
62. This draft has not been approved by the ABA and does not presently constitute ABA
policy.
63. Kutak, supra note 61, at 47.
64. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 44, rule 3.3 at 124. The Model Rules recognize that
the lawyer is an officer of the court and must always conduct himself in accordance with the
law. "Given this duty, never, under any circumstances, may a lawyer knowingly proffer perjured testimony and thereby participate in a fraud against the court." Burger, Standards of Conductfor Prosecutionand Defense Personnel, 5 AM. CRiM. L.Q. 11, 12 (1966). See also Frankel, The
Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975).
65. ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 44, rule 3.3 at 126.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 129.
Although a lawyer's paramount duty is to vigorously pursue the client's interests, "that
duty must be met in conjunction with, rather than in opposition to, other professional
obligations." Thorton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C. App. 1976). "An attorney
owes his first duty to the court. He assumed his obligations toward it before he ever
had a client. His oath requires him to be absolutely honest even though his client's
interests may seem to require a contrary course. The [lawyer] cannot serve two mas-
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perjury or other falsification of evidence. 60 Such an obligation overrides the
lawyer's duty to keep the client's revelations confidential.
Rule 3.3(a)(4) of the Model Rules provides that "a lawyer shall not
knowingly. . . offer evidence that the lawyers knows to be false. If a lawyer
has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer
'6 9
shall take reasonable remedial measures."
When a criminal defendant seeks to offer testimony that the lawyer
knows to be false, the proposed rules provide that the attorney should attempt to dissuade the client from giving perjurious testimony. 70 If this confrontation occurs before trial and the dissuasion fails, the lawyer should seek
to withdraw from the case. 7 ' The Commission recognizes, however, that
withdrawal may not always be possible, "because trial is imminent or because the confrontation with the client does not take place until the trial
itself, or because no other counsel is available."' 72 If the court does not permit withdrawal, the Model Rules require a lawyer to disclose his client's
perjury to the court. "It is for the court then to determine what should be
done-making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a
73
mistrial or perhaps nothing."
If the client controverts the lawyer's version of their communication after the lawyer's disclosure, and the issue of whether the client has committed
perjury arises, the Commission recognizes that a mistrial may be unavoidable since the lawyer cannot represent the client in the resolution of the perjury issue. 74 If a client attempts to produce several mistrials in the same
manner, the Model Rules provide that such actions are "a deliberate abuse
of the right to counsel and as such a waiver of the right to further
75
representation."
Although the Model Rules envision that an advocate must disclose perjury in all instances when it occurs, Rule 3.3(a) provides that the obligation
ters and the one [he has] undertaken to serve primarily is the court." In re Integration

of the Nebraska Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265, 268 (1937).
Id.
68. Id. at 126.
69. Id. at 124. Commentary to rule 3.3 compares this rule to the Code of Professional

Responsibility:
[T]he first sentence of this subparagraph is similar to DR 7-102(A)(4), which provides
or false evidence. The
second sentence of Rule 3.3(a)(4) resolves an ambiguity in the Code concerning the

that a lawyer shall not "knowingly use" perjured testimony
action required of a lawyer when he discovers that he

has offered

perjured testimony

or false evidence.
Id. at 128.
70. Id. at 126.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 127. The Model Rules recognize that a practical time limit on the obligation to
rectify the presentation of false evidence is required. Id. "The conclusion of the proceeding is a
reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation." Id. Further, rule 1.6(b)(3) provides: "A lawyer may reveal [information relating to representation of a client] to the extent the
lawyer believes necessary: . . . to rectify the consequences of a a client's criminal or fraudulent
act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used.
... Id., rule 1.6(b)(3), at
37. Rule 1.6(b)(3) modifies DR 7-102(B)(1) by making the disclosure of a fraud committed in
the course of representation optional rather than mandatory.
74. Id. at 127.
75. Id.
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is subordinate to constitutional requirements. 76 The qualification addresses
the situation in some jurisdictions in which the right to counsel in criminal
cases is construed to include a right that counsel not disclose perjury by the
accused. 77 Further, the duty to disclose perjury under Model Rule 3.3(a)
arises only when a lawyer "knows" that the offered evidence is false. The
rule permits, but does not require, an attorney to refuse to offer evidence.
that he "reasonably believes is false."'7 8 This rule would presumably give the
lawyer more discretion to refuse to offer testimony than the Code of Profes79
sional Responsibility presently allows.

D.

The American Layer's Code of Conduct

In 1979, at the request of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
(A.T.L.A.), a commission of the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers
80
Foundation was formed to prepare a new code of conduct for lawyers.
Professor Freedman serves as the reporter for the project, and released the
first discussion draft of the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct (Code of
Conduct) for public comment in June of 19 8 0 .61
The general philosophy of the Code of Conduct is that the lawyer's primary duty is to the client; it rejects any proposal to weaken the protection of
an accused client's rights, including the proposition that a lawyer should
reveal a client's secrets "except in the most extreme circumstances."18 2 The
philosophy set forth in the Code of Conduct is an extension of Professor
Freedman's assertion that the "lawyer must hold in strictest confidence the
disclosures made by the client in the course of the professional relationship."' 83 He concludes that, between confidentiality to the client and candor
to the court, the former is significantly more important. 8 4 In his view, the
85
lawyer has a duty to attempt to dissuade a client from committing perjury,
but if the defendant insists upon taking the witness stand to testify falsely,
"the obligation of confidentiality, in the context of our adversary system,
apparently allows the attorney no alternative to putting a perjurious witness
on the stand without explicit or implicit disclosure of the attorney's knowledge to either the judge or the jury."' 86 Consequently, the lawyer should
76. Id.
77. Id. at 127. See, e.g., Ohio v. Trapp, 52 Ohio App. 2d 189, 368 N.E.2d 1278 (1977).
78. See ABA MODEL RuLEs, supra note 44, rule 3.3(c) at 124.
79. Id. at 128. See ABA CODE, supra note 7, DR 7-I02(A)(4), which prohibits the lawyer
from offering evidence the lawyer "knows" is false. A number of court decisions, however, support the approach of the Model Rules in this regard. See In re Branch, 70 Cal. 2d 200, 449 P.2d
174, 74 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1969); In re Atchley, 48 Cal. 2d 408, 310 P.2d 15 (1957); Thornton v.
United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C. App.), cert. dented, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976); Illinois v. Brown, 54
Ill. 2d 21, 294 N.E.2d 285 (1973). The belief required by rule 3.3(c) is a "reasonable" one. See
Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977) for the proposition that an unsubstantiated
suspicion is insufficient. See also Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Va. 1959).
80. AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT ii (Discussion Draft June 1980) [hereinafter
cited as CODE OF CONDUCT].
81. Id.
82. Id. at v.
83. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 27.
84. Id.
85. Freedman, supra note 39, at 1478.
86. Id. at 1477-78. Professor Freedman was subjected to personal attack after he presented
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place the client on the stand, elicit testimony on direct examination, and
then argue the testimony to the jury as skillfully as he possibly can.8 7 In
Professor Freedman's opinion, any contrary position would be inconsistent
with "the maintenance of the adversary system, the presumption of innocence, the prosecutor's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
. . . and the obligation of confidentiality. .. .
Two alternative sets of rules regarding the lawyer-client confidential relationship are provided in the Code of Conduct. 89 Both are more protective
of confidentiality than either the present Code of Professional Responsibility
or the proposed ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Section 1.2 of
Alternative A provides:
Without the client's knowing and voluntary consent, a lawyer shall
not directly or indirectly reveal a client's confidence, or use it in
any way detrimental to the interests of the client, except as provided in Rules 1.3 to 1.6, and Rule 6.5. (Rules 1.3 to 1.6 permit
divulgence under compulsion of law; to prevent imminent danger
to life; to avoid proceeding before a corrupted judge or juror; and
to defend the lawyer or the lawyer's associates from formally instituted charges of misconduct. Rule 6.5 permits withdrawal in noncriminal cases when the client has induced the lawyer to act
through material misrepresentation, even though withdrawal
might indirectly divulge a confidence.). 9°
Alternative A prohibits using a client's confidence in a way detrimental to
the interests of the client. In all instances in the Code of Conduct, the interests of the client are determined by the client after having been counseled by
the lawyer.9 1 Further, Alternative A permits, but does not require, divulgence of a client's confidences in certain situations, but rejects the previously
recognized exception which permits lawyers to violate confidentiality to collect an unpaid fee. 9 2 In addition, if there has been inadequate opportunity
for consultation with the client, the Code of Conduct provides that "the lawyer should act in accordance with the lawyer's reasonable understanding of
'9 3
what the client would perceive to be in the client's interest."
Alternative B is even more protective of confidentiality between lawyer
and client:
Without the client's knowing and voluntary consent, a lawyer shall
not directly or indirectly reveal a client's confidence, or use it in
any way detrimental to the interests of the client, as the client perthe substance of this position in a paper to the Criminal Trial Institute of the District of Columbia. Several judges complained to the Committee on Admissions and Grievances of the District
Court of the District of Columbia, urging that disciplinary action be taken against him. After
four months of proceedings, the committee announced its decision to "proceed no further in the
matter." Robinson, supra note 17, at 552 n.52.
87. See Robinson, supra note 17, at 552. See also M. FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 31.

88. Freedman, supra note 39, at 1482.
89. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 80, § 1.2.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 106. See also id. §§ 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, and Preamble at 4.
92. Id. at 106. The Code of Conduct claims that the reason for such an exception-the
lawyer's financial interest-"is not sufficiently weighty to justify impairing confidentiality." Id.
Set also ABA CODE, supra note 7, at DR 4-101(C)(4).
93. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 80, at 103.
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ceives them, or as the lawyer reasonably understands the client to
94
perceive them if there is inadequate opportunity for consultation.
Neither alternative permits divulging a client's confidence in cases of
future or continuing crimes. 95 In fact, under the Code of Conduct, a disciplinary violation is committed if an attorney refrains from presenting a client's false testimony in the ordinary96 manner, or refrains from using that
testimony in summation to the jury.
A major objection to the Code of Conduct is that the obligation of confidentiality should not apply to a client's statement that he intends to commit perjury. The attorney-client privilege has not historically extended to
97
the client who seeks legal assistance in the commission of a future crime.
Further, the position espoused by Professor Freedman is a "significant extension and corruption of the defense attorney's role,"9 8 since it encourages an
attorney to actively assist in presenting known perjured testimony. This role
had been summarily rejected in the first edition of the Defense Standards:
It has even been suggested, but universally rejected by the legal
profession, that a lawyer may be excused for acquiescing in the use
of known perjured testimony on the transparently spurious thesis
that the principle of confidentiality requires this. While no honorable lawyer would accept this notion and every experienced advocate can see its basic fallacy as a matter of tactics apart from
morality and law, the mere advocacy of such fraud demeans the
profession and tends to drag it to the level of gangsters and their
'mouthpiece' lawyers in the public eye. That this concept is universally repudiated by ethical lawyers does not fully repair the
gross disservice done by the few unscrupulous enough to practice
it.

99

In this regard, the approach to the client-perjury issue recommended by the
American Lawyer's Code of Conduct does not adequately address the lawyer's obligation to insure candor to the court.
III.

A

PROPOSED SOLUTION

The Defense Standards suggest that every jurisdiction establish an Advisory Council of eminent trial lawyers to assist attorneys in resolving ethical
questions:
94. Id.
95. But rule 3.6 of the Code of Conduct states: "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly participate in creating perjured testimony, other false evidence, or a misrepresentation upon which
another person is likely to rely and suffer material detriment." Therefore, although an attorney
may not "knowingly participate" in creating perjured testimony, if the perjured testimony is a
result of the client's decision, the attorney does not commit a disciplinary violation by developing the client's direct testimony and arguing it to the jury. Id. at 110, Illustrative Case 1(j).
96. See id. at 109, Illustrative Case 1(i).
97. C. MCCORMicK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 95 (2d ed. 1972); Robinson,

supra note 17, at 547 n.10.
98. Lefstein, supra note 52, at 674. There is, however, some evidence that practicing attorneys favor Professor Freedman's approach. Id. at 675.
99. STANDARDS. (lst ed.), supra note 1, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, at 142.
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Advisory councils on professional conduct
(a) In every jurisdiction an advisory body of lawyers selected
for their experience, integrity, and standing at the trial bar should
be established as an advisory council on problems of professional
conduct in criminal cases. This council should provide prompt and
confidential guidance and advice to lawyers seeking assistance in
the application of standards of professional conduct in criminal
cases.
(b) Communications between a lawyer and such an advisory
council should have the same privilege for protection of the client's
confidences as exists between lawyer and client. The council
should be bound by statute or rule of court in the same manner as
a lawyer is bound not to reveal any disclosure of the client except
(i) if the client challenges the effectiveness of the lawyer's conduct of the case and the lawyer relies on the guidance
received from the council, and
(ii) if the lawyer's conduct is called into question in an
authoritative disciplinary inquiry or proceeding. l ° °
To date, no jurisdiction has adopted the standard relating to Advisory
Councils. 10 1 The concept, however, can be used to reach a practical and
02
ethically sound solution to the lawyer's dilemma.
Under the Advisory Council concept, when defense counsel learns, prior
to trial, that his client intends to commit perjury, he must submit a written
statement to the Council, documenting to the extent possible the facts which
establish the basis for the conclusion that the accused client intends to offer
false testimony. The statement should also set forth the efforts which defense
counsel has made to persuade the client not to testify falsely. If the Council
determines that the written statement substantiates the lawyer's belief that
his client intends to commit perjury, the Council then shall recommend to
the court that the lawyer be allowed to withdraw. The Council's recommendation should appear on the outside of a sealed file which contains a documented and complete record of the Advisory Council's proceedings. The file
is then delivered to the court. If the Advisory Council recommended that
the lawyer be permitted to withdraw, the court must grant the motion and
advise the defendant regarding subsequent procedures and that the sealed
materials may be used for impeachment at any subsequent trial. Thereafter,
10 3
the defendant has a new right to appointed or hired counsel.
If the defendant elects to adhere to the same version of the facts, his new
100. DEFENSE

STANDARDS,

supra note 6, at 4-1.4. The Advisory Council idea is borrowed

from England, where a somewhat similar body has existed for some years. See R. WALKER &
M. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 226 (4th ed. 1976). See also Hoolihan, Ethical Standards for Defence Counsel, STUDIES IN CRIM. L. & PROC. (Canadian Bar Association 1973);
Schroeder, Some Ethical Problems in Cnminal Law, L.S.U.C. Special Lectures 87 (1963).
101. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 4-1.4, commentary at 4.18.
102. Ideally, an Advisory Council should be established in each judicial district within the
state.
103. The Advisory Councils will advise lawyers on a broad range of ethical problems, such
as threats by clients against his lawyer, conflicts of personality, and conflicts of interest. Therefore, the court will be unaware of the defendant's prior intention to commit perjury. At this
juncture, it is only apparent that an irreconcilable conflict between the lawyer and his client
mandates withdrawal.
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counsel would have no basis for knowing that the defendant intends to commit perjury, and the case would proceed to trial. The Advisory Council's file
would remain sealed unless the defendant elects to take the witness stand.
At that point, the court is authorized to open the file and review its contents.
If the file establishes that the defendant intended to commit perjury at his
first trial, the contents would be disclosed to both prosecution and defense
counsel. When the defendant testifies, the prosecution may use the information contained in the file for impeachment. 10 4 Defense counsel is permitted
to fully develop his client's testimony on direct examination, and may advocate acceptance of his client's testimony in closing argument, because his
client's credibility is for the jury to determine, and the attorney is not sponsoring testimony known to be false. The defendant's credibility, of course,
will be weighed against his prior inconsistent statements to his former lawyer, which the prosecutor will use for impeachment purposes. In this way,
the truth-finding goal of the adversary system is not compromised.' 0 5
If the new counsel discovers, prior to trial, that the defendant intends to
commit perjury, he must also submit a written statement to the Advisory
Council, documenting the facts which establish the proposed perjury. Upon
receipt of a second file which recommends withdrawl, the court must open
both files to determine if the defendant's intention to commit perjury is the
basis for withdrawal in both cases. If such is the case, the court will not
permit counsel to withdraw, and the defendant will be deemed to have
waived his privilege to testify in his own behalf. 10 6 The defendant's privilege
thus gives way so that the lawyer is not required to develop and argue known
false testimony. 10 7 Such a procedure prevents use of the same ploy for unlimited continuances. The judge may also consider the mendacity of the defendant in sentencing. 10 8 Again, the truth-finding goal of the adversary
system is not compromised because the defendant is prohibited from offering
perjured testimony.
The ethical dilemma created by the perjurious defendant may also arise
in another setting. If defense counsel does not learn of his client's intended
perjury until trial is imminent or has commenced, he must still make a motion to withdraw under the Council system. Defense counsel cannot specify
the reasons for his motion, but should request a brief recess to present the
ethical dilemma to the Advisory Council. The trial court must grant the
recess so that the Advisory Council procedure can be followed. If the Council recommends withdrawal, the trial court, under the doctrine of manifest
104. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Either the prosecution or the defense
must then be permitted to call the first defense counsel as a witness, in order to preserve the
defendant's right of confrontation under the sixth amendment. See California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970). Moreover, the admission of the first lawyer's statements contained in the file
may be subject to a hearsay objection by the defendant.
105. Set DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, at Introduction.
106. Id.
107. The lawyer vouches for the authenticity of the evidence he submits at trial. See C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 97.
108.

See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 40 (1978).
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necessity,' 0 9 must grant defense counsel's motion to withdraw and declare a
mistrial.
The establishment of an Advisory Council is within the rule-making
power of the highest court of each state. I 10 For example, in Colorado, the
Supreme Court has both constitutional and statutory authority to promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in criminal cases.'I' The Defense Standards generally provide that the communications between a
lawyer and the Advisory Council have the same privilege for the protection
of the client's confidences as exists between the lawyer and client.' 12 Therefore, the rule in each jurisdiction which creates an Advisory Council must
also provide for a limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege to permit
impeachment as a means of protecting the integrity of the truth-finding goal
of the adversary system.' 3 Consequently, a limited waiver of the attorneyclient privilege is justified when the court is authorized to open the sealed file
1
and reveal its contents to the prosecutor for impeachment purposes. 14
It should be kept in mind that the lawyer's dilemma occurs infrequently
in practice. Accordingly, the intricacies of the proposed solution are justified. The Advisory Council solution resolves the ethical dilemma which has
been analyzed and reanalyzed so often.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The common law adversary system as a means for ascertaining the truth
of a criminal charge can survive only if both prosecution and defense counsel
present reliable evidence to guide the trier of fact. Truth-finding is deflected
whenever perjury is committed. As officers of the court, lawyers have a primary duty to preserve the integrity of the adversary system by preventing
the court or jury from being misled by the presentation of false or perjured
testimony. Even the attorney-client privilege must bend when the sanctity
of the oath is disregarded by an accused client proferring false evidence. The
obligations of defense counsel to the court and to his client are in direct
conflict under the current ABA Code. The author's solution to the dilemma
balances the ethical considerations in such a way that the lawyer is not
forced to advocate the acceptance of perjured testimony. Perjury is exposed
with the least possible invasion of the attorney-client privilege.
109. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1970); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
110. J. PARNESS & C. KORBAKES, A STUDY OF THE PROCEDURAL RULEMAKING POWER IN
THE UNITED STATES (American Judicature Society 1973).
111. COLO. CONST. art. 6, § 21; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-2-109 (1973).
112. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 4-1.4, commentary at 4-1.8.
113. The attorney-client privilege is a substantive right. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90107(b) (1973). It is within the province of the judiciary, however, to determine the procedural
limitations imposed on the privilege. See, e.g., People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275

(1978).
114. The rule should be tightly drafted to prevent the disclosure of any privileged communications unrelated to the perjury between the client and lawyer or between the lawyer and the
Advisory Council. Additionally, the rule should permit either the prosecutor or the defense
lawyer to call the first defense lawyer who was confronted with the dilemma to testify as to the
facts which were before the Advisory Council.

